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 1. Introduction. 
 
In the mid-1990s Caterpillar closed a large plant in Pennsylvania and split its production 
into four new smaller plants in Mississippi, North Carolina, Kentucky, and South Carolina.  
According to published reports on the case, the move was precipitated by Caterpillar’s desire to 
take advantage of substantial tax-relief incentives that had been extended.1  The fore-mentioned 
Southern states had been offering incentives to Caterpillar for some time, yet Caterpillar had 
been reluctant to relocate because the relatively small pool of skilled machinists in these states 
was apparently deemed insufficient to support a “standard issue” Caterpillar plant.  This fact 
notwithstanding, Caterpillar was eventually able to revise its production process into smaller 
operations that could be dispersed across these four separate locations.   
Previous economic literature has examined a number of issues connected with regional 
competition for investment – most notably, whether competition among regions promotes or 
impedes efficient location of production.  However, the above example points to a number of 
important issues.  First, agglomeration externalities can lower the costs firms face while, at the 
same time, entrenching them in specific locations.  Such entrenchment makes it more difficult to 
lure these firms to different localities and potentially makes them less able to garner tax 
incentives.2  Second, the production technologies that firms ultimately develop may themselves 
be endogenously determined by the regional competition for investment process.  In particular, 
the desire of firms to elicit favorable tax concessions may substantially impact the trajectory of 
technical progress and even lead to inefficient production and location decisions by firms.  Third, 
the inefficiencies just noted may, in turn, be compounded by the agglomeration externalities that 
                                                 
1 Caterpillar was also involved in protracted disputes with its unionized labor force in the northern U.S. states and 
the “right-to-work” provisions in southern states were also likely part of their attraction to relocation possibilities. 
2 On the other hand, if agglomeration externalities accompany firms when they relocate, they may be even more 
prized by competing regions. 
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are often inherent to industrial development.  These latter two observations have been largely 
ignored in previous literature and play important roles in our analysis. 
More specifically, we introduce endogenously-determined technical innovation and 
agglomeration externalities into a model of regional competition for investment.  We first present 
a benchmark model of regional competition in which agglomeration externalities are present and 
firms’ productive capabilities are specified exogenously.  Firms choose production plans (given 
their fixed capabilities) and their location to maximize profits, while regions choose tax packages 
to maximize a region’s welfare.  In such a world, we show that competition leads to Pareto 
efficient location and production decisions by the firm.  This result obtains despite the potential 
for agglomeration externalities.  In fact, it is regional competition itself that allows regions to 
internalize such externalities.   
We then relax the assumption of exogenously specified technology and allow firms to 
carry out research and development (R&D) in a step prior to regional competition for their 
investment.  The ability for firms to observably alter their productive capabilities proves to be far 
from innocuous.   Indeed, we show that it enables firms to distort the subsequent regional 
competition and can lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes.  The intuition is that firms are able to 
extract more favorable tax breaks when there is stronger competition amongst regions to secure 
the firm as a “resident”.  This provides firms the incentive to choose technologies that do not 
strongly favor one region at the expense of all others, and are generally inferior from an 
efficiency standpoint.  As a result, regional competition can also distort both production and 
location decisions.  Furthermore, these inefficiencies may be exacerbated by the fact that 
suboptimal firm location may lead to weakened agglomeration externalities.  In other words, 
firms may be induced to choose technologies that reduce agglomeration externalities, as did 
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Caterpillar in the mid-1990s.  This provides one potential explanation for why Ellison and 
Glaeser (1997) find less geographic concentration of U.S. manufacturing than one would expect. 
These results complement and contrast with previous literature in a number of ways.  The 
natural intuition for many economists is that competition for investments by regions is akin to a 
prisoner’s dilemma as it has little (if any) impact on eventual location decisions, but may 
nonetheless lead to large transfers of regional tax revenues to the locating firms.  Our benchmark 
model complements this conclusion by showing this result obtains even when accounting for 
agglomeration externalities, provided firms’ production technologies are fixed.  This is an 
important result in the sense that if the firms are owned by domestic shareholders, this 
competition among regions results in transfers from the regions to the firm’s shareholders, but no 
obvious loss in aggregate welfare for the country as a whole.3  The only notable welfare loss is 
due to resources that may be “wasted” in the bidding process itself.       
In fact, a number of previous studies have focused on reasons why competition may 
actually promote more efficient location of production.   Bond and Samuelson (1986) focus on a 
scenario of asymmetric information, where firms are uncertain ex ante about the productivity of 
a particular region, but the region knows its productivity with certainty.   In such a scenario, 
competition for firms facilitates efficient location of firms, as initially offered subsidies (or tax 
holidays) signal the productivity of the region to the firm.  Black and Hoyt (1989) address 
another inefficiency that may be alleviated by regional competition for investment.  Their 
starting point is that most regions provide public goods and services (such as infrastructure) up to 
the level that average costs equal average benefits because of standard public finance methods of 
                                                 
3 If the firms are foreign-owned then these transfers have more obvious negative welfare implications for the host 
country bidding for the investment, and this scenario lies behind Graham and Krugman’s (1995) recommendation 
that the U.S. federal government ban state-level incentives directed at attracting foreign direct investment.  On the 
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funding public goods.  When the marginal cost of providing public services to a potentially 
relocating firm are smaller than the tax revenues the firm would yield for additional public 
services, regions can offer subsidies that reduce the distortion caused by the average cost pricing 
of public services.  Thus, this leads to more efficient location of production across regions.  Like 
Black and Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996) examines two regions competing with subsidies for 
investment in an environment of perfect information.  While most previous studies focused on 
cost differences between regions, Haaparanta (1996) shows that demand conditions in the region 
(assuming all or most production is for local consumption) impacts that region’s offered 
subsidies as well.  Thus, a high-cost country may attract investment in a competitive 
environment due to demand conditions.  Furthermore, depending on how demand and cost 
conditions are affected by investment, a subsidy competition between regions may result in 
different firm location than if there were no such competition.  King, McAfee, and Preston 
(1993) explore a bidding war between two regions for an investment where no participant in the 
bidding process (either the firms or the regions) know the productivity of the region with 
certainty until the firm is located, but where subsequent relocation of the firm is possible.  The 
model yields efficient outcomes even when the regions first play a game in infrastructure 
investment (where greater infrastructure yields higher surplus from investment) prior to the 
bidding process.  
In summary, most recent theoretical literature on regional competition for investment has 
almost exclusively focused on how regional competition may promote efficiency or at least lead 
to efficient outcomes despite imperfect or asymmetric information on the part of various 
participants.  In contrast, this paper points out that there are potentially serious inefficiencies 
                                                                                                                                                             
other hand, Davies (2000) shows that state/regional competition can be welfare improving for a union of 
states/regions if investment involves positive externalities for other states/regions in the union. 
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induced by regional competition that go beyond resources used to participate in the bidding 
process.  These inefficiencies affect firm location, production technology, and the agglomeration 
externalities that accrue.  Perhaps the most closely related literature to ours is work by Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1984), Brander and Spencer (1987), and Bond and Samuelson (1989).  These papers 
examine a bilateral bargaining process between a firm and a host region and consider the 
possibility of renegotiation or even unilateral action by the region (such as expropriation) after 
the firm has located in the region.  One general result of these papers is that firms with flexible 
production technology will respond by choosing inefficiently less capital-intensive production 
processes when initially investing in a host region.  These papers focus only on a bilateral 
negotiation between one firm and one region, in contrast to our regional competition model with 
multiple regions and firms.  In addition, they do not consider agglomeration externalities.4   
A few theoretical papers have considered competition for investment in the presence of 
agglomeration externalities, including Baldwin and Krugman (2000) and Ludema and Wooton 
(2000).5  These papers focus on how agglomeration forces affect the intensity of tax competition 
and optimal tax rates across regions.  Our focus is directed toward examining the manner in 
which agglomerative forces and regional competition for investment may jointly impact the 
location decisions of firms as well as their choices regarding the development and 
implementation of production technology. 
 A final departure of our paper from previous literature is our use of case study evidence. 
Previous literature has only provided evidence that regional competition for investments exists 
                                                 
4 A more recent paper by Janeba (2000) develops a model where a firm may (inefficiently) choose to have excess 
capacity in two regions to mitigate either region’s incentive to apply a confiscatory tax after a sunk investment 
decision.   
5 Head and Ries (1996) and Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) examine the impact of both regional incentives and 
agglomeration externalities on firm investment decisions in an empirical setting.  Both studies find evidence that 
agglomeration externalities attract investment, while Head and Ries (1996) find that agglomeration externalities 
enhance the effect of regional incentive policies. 
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and can be intense, whereas our more detailed analyses provide examples of region and firm 
behavior that is consistent with important assumptions and implications of our model.  This 
seems to be novel in the literature despite the accessible and substantial media accounts of the 
region-level bidding process for high-profile investments.  While case study evidence has well-
known limitations, we feel it is important for the literature to develop models that are 
demonstrably consistent with cases we observe in reality, rather than create a myriad of 
theoretical possibilities. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents our benchmark model of regional 
competition in the presence of agglomeration externalities, but with fixed production capabilities 
of the firm.  Section 3 expands the benchmark model to include strategic investment in R&D and 
thus allowing for the endogenous determination of technical innovation.  Each of these sections 
provides relatively brief case study evidence that is consistent with our model’s implications.  A 
final section concludes. 
 
2. Regional competition for investment: Benchmark model. 
2.1. Theory.   
This section introduces models of region/firm location games - interactive environments 
in which regions actively use tax incentives as an inducement for firms to locate within their 
borders.  An important feature of such environments is that the coalescing of firms in a given 
locality may in of itself affect their profitability, i.e., agglomeration externalities may exist.  
Examples include the resultant influx and training of skilled workers, enhancements to local 
infrastructure, expansion of supporting service industries, etc.  Our analysis demonstrates that 
equilibrium behavior supports Pareto efficiency even in the presence of agglomeration 
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externalities, provided firms are not actively engaged in research and development.  (The case of 
endogenously determined technical innovation is examined in the following section.) 
The decision making agents in our model are composed of a finite set I of firms and a 
finite set M of regions/municipalities.  Each firm must select both a region in which to locate and 
a production plan to employ.  Each region must select a profile of tax incentive packages to offer 
firms, incentives that may be contingent on both firm location and production decisions.  Such 
contingencies may reflect, for instance, the imposition of zoning restrictions, pollution penalties, 
hiring quotas, etc. 
To formally characterize the action spaces outlined above, we let X=M denote each firm’s 
space of location plans and let Y represent the space of all input employment plans, which we 
assume to be a closed subset of a finite Euclidean space.  Thus X I=×i∈IX and Y I=×i∈IY represent 
collective location and production plan spaces respectively.  It is also convenient to abuse 
notation and let m(xI)={i∈I| xi=m} for each m∈M and xI=(xi)i∈I∈X I.  In other words, m(xI) is the 
set of all firms selecting region m according to the location choice profile xI . 
We assume that regions have full flexibility in their tax policy design.  Formally, a tax 
strategy for region m is a mapping tm: X I× Y I →ℜ I that specifies in-region firm taxation levels 
that may be dependent on in-region firm actions but are independent of out-of-region firm 
actions.  Naturally, we shall also assume regions are incapable of taxing firms outside of their 
jurisdiction.  Let Tm  denote the space of all such tax policies for region m and let T M = ×m∈MTm 
denote the space of all tax policy profiles.  It may also be worth emphasizing that we place no 
differentiability or continuity constraints on taxation strategies.  As a consequence, our general 
notion of “tax strategy” effectively encompasses any regulatory device that may be used to 
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control firm behavior.  For instance, pollution controls may be mimicked by the imposition of 
large lump sum penalties for discharges in excess of specified standards. 
To recap the sequence of play: regions begin by simultaneously announcing their 
respective taxation policies and firms respond to these announcements by selecting both a region 
for their home operations and a production plan.  A firm strategy is thus a tax-policy-contingent 
plan-of-action, i.e., a mapping s:T M→X×Y.  The space of all such mappings is denoted by S and 
the space of firm strategy profiles is S I=×i∈IS.  Given a profile of firm and region strategies sI 
and tM it follows that tm(sI(tM))i represents the tax imposed by region m on firm i. 
We now turn to a specification of region and firm preferences.  Each region m∈M is 
assumed to be endowed with a real-valued welfare function ωm : X I× Y I →ℜ which is 
independent of the choices of firms locating outside of region m, i.e., if (xI,yI) represents the 
collective profile of firm actions, then ωm is independent of xi and yi whenever i∉ m(xI).   
Similarly, each firm i∈I is endowed with a real-valued profit function πi: X I× Y I →ℜ, which we 
assume is independent of the choices of firms that do not locate in i’s chosen region, i.e., πi  is 
independent of xj  and yj whenever xj≠xi. 
Finally, we assume that both region and firm preferences are quasi-linear in tax 
payments.  Thus, a region’s net welfare is the sum of the welfare it receives from realized firm 
decisions and that it receives from the tax revenues it collects.  Similarly, a firm’s net profit 
function is the difference between the profits it receives from realized firm decisions and the tax 
payment it owes to its home region.  Formally, if (sI, tM) represents a profile of firm and region 
strategies, m and i respectively represent a given region and firm, H represents all firms locating 
in region m and n is the region in which i chooses to locate, then region m’s net welfare is 
ωm(sI(tM))+∑j∈Htm(sI(tM))j  and firm i’s net profit is πi(sI(tM)) – tn(sI(tM))i .  (Note that our central 
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insights can be re-articulated without the profit/welfare restrictions outlined in the paragraphs 
above.  However, doing so comes at a cost of increased technical complexity that diminishes our 
paper’s accessibility.) 
A profile (tM*,sI*) of region and firm strategies is an equilibrium if no region or firm can 
benefit from unilaterally altering its strategy.  Such a profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if 
the firm strategies are in equilibrium on every tax policy subgame.6 
 
Theorem 1: Every subgame perfect equilibrium is Pareto efficient. 
 
Proof:  Suppose there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (tM*,sI*) which is not Pareto 
optimal.  It follows there must exist a region m, a set of firm’s J⊆I, and payoffs ωm´, (πj´)j∈J that 
strictly dominate the payoffs these agents would receive from (tM*,sI*) and which are feasible 
when the firms in J locate in m.  Let (yj´)j∈J denote production plans that would support these 
dominating payoffs.  Let tm´ be a tax policy such that for each j∈J, firm j is ensured precisely the 
payoff πj´, irrespective of the actions of others, as long as j locates in region m and adopts the 
production plan yj´.  Further assume that tm´ deters firms in J from choosing alternative 
production plans with a threat of high taxes.  Likewise, assume firms outside of J are deterred 
from entering m with a high tax threat.  Recall that firm strategies are assumed to be in subgame 
perfect equilibrium.  Thus if m adopts the tax policy tm´ instead of tm*, it follows that precisely 
the firms in J will locate in region m and they will in turn select the production plans specified by 
(yj´)j∈J. By design, region m will then receive the payoff ωm´.  We conclude that tm´  is a strictly 
                                                 
6 Recall that firms observe tax policy prior to making their location/production choices, thus every profile of tax 
policies effectively determines a distinct subgame within the comprehensive dynamic structure. 
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better response to (tM*,sI*) than is tm*, contradicting the assumption that (tM*,sI*) was a subgame 
perfect equilibrium.   QED 
 
This result reveals that while competition between regions for firms may well induce 
some reallocation of wealth between firms and regions, equilibrium behavior will nonetheless 
induce Pareto efficient location and production decisions.  Indeed, such competition effectively 
enables regions to internalize the agglomeration externalities that would otherwise lead to Pareto 
inefficient firm decisions.  The following case study highlights the extent to which regions may 
design tax policy to internalize externalities and manipulate firm behavior. 
 
2.2. Case study evidence. 
Begun in 1993, Oregon’s Strategic Initiative Program (SIP) was designed to lure large 
investments to the state by offering up to 15 years of property tax relief for up to $100 million of 
assessed property.  Another interesting feature of the program is that participating companies 
must also make a direct community service payment to the local government equal to 25 percent 
of the abated amount, not to exceed $2 million per year.   The negotiated agreements also 
stipulate employment targets to receive the benefits of the program.   
With semiconductor operations in Gresham, Oregon since 1988, Fujitsu Microelectronics 
was one of the first companies to take advantage of Oregon’s SIP program.  The community 
service projects money from Fujitsu’s SIP payments went into supporting a variety of programs 
including a microelectronics training center at a local community college; transportation, 
childcare, and housing programs for its employees; training of low-income and at-risk workers; 
and efforts to meet ever-increasing targets on the purchases of local goods and services.  
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Obviously, these are all activities that the company would not necessarily have participated in 
without the stipulations of SIP and some of the activities are ones that extend positive 
externalities to other firms in the region. 
This case-study clearly demonstrates the efforts of a region to use tax policy as a 
mechanism to influence factors beyond just the selection of firm location.  As in our theoretical 
model, the state of Oregon has preferences over how firms choose to operate (what services they 
offer, who they choose to hire, who they choose to purchase from, etc.) as well as where they 
choose to locate.  Moreover, there is a recognition that such factors may create externalities for 
other firms or workers that may locate in the region and may prove instrumental in additional 
recruitment efforts.  Given that regions do indeed employ such tax policy tools, our benchmark 
theoretical model would appear to be a reasonable facsimile of the real world – provided that 
production technology is exogenously specified.  We turn to the endogenous determination of 
technology in the following section. 
 
3. Competition for investment with endogenous technical innovation. 
3.1. Theory. 
The benchmark model outlined in previous section does not allow for firms to alter their 
productive capabilities through investments in research and development (R&D).  In many real 
world settings, however, the willingness of a firm to relocate may well depend on its ability to 
effect change in its production alternatives.  For instance, current technology may dictate that 
profits be very dependent on the availability of highly skilled workers, while R&D efforts may 
yield new technologies that substantially mitigate this dependence and render firms more 
geographically mobile.  Similarly, the willingness of a region to actively lure a firm may depend 
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on the firm’s ability to adopt production methods that are to the region’s liking (hire local 
workers, purchase local goods, pollute minimally, etc.).  In this section we enrich our model by 
formally introducing an R&D investment stage to the competition for firm investment game.  
The resulting structure will be referred to as an R&D/firm location game. 
It should be noted that we use the phrases “R&D” and “technology” in a rather liberal 
sense.  Indeed, R&D efforts might literally be aimed toward the discovery of a new technical 
process that improves productive efficiency, as one might traditionally envision.  However, 
efforts to establish political connections and contacts in a region or obtain a clearer 
understanding for how best to employ region specific resources may also be effective in 
expanding a firm’s production possibilities.  For the purposes of our theoretical model, there is 
no reason to distinguish between the various avenues for expanding production possibilities.  
Consequently, we shall refer to all such efforts as “R&D” and refer to the ensuing expansion of 
production possibilities as improvement in “technology”. 
We now turn to the formal details of our model.  Let us assume that each firm i∈I is 
endowed with a set Θi  of investment strategies from which it may select.  For each θi ∈Θi let 
ci(θi) denote the cost the firm incurs from this investment strategy.  For simplicity, we suppress 
the effects of risk and uncertainty and assume that R&D investment leads to certain outcomes 
regarding technical “know-how” and its effects on firm profit and region welfare functions.   
Letting Γ denote the game outlined in section 1, this R&D extension effectively indexes the 
game by θ I =(θi)i∈I as profit and welfare functions alike are dependent on the state of technology, 
and thus are in turn dependent on the R&D strategies pursued by firms.  Indeed, different states 
of technical innovation may lead to different levels of profit and productivity, different levels of 
agglomeration externalities, different levels of pollution, different levels of local employment, 
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etc.  This addition of an R&D stage transforms our benchmark model into an R&D/firm location 
game with the following sequence of play.  In stage 0, firms simultaneously commit to R&D 
strategies.  These commitments are observable to all firms and all regions in subsequent periods 
so that choices in these periods may be made contingent on realized R&D decisions.   The profile 
of R&D strategies θ I generated in stage 0 induces the two stage game Γ(θ I), which is identical 
to the benchmark structure outlined in section 1 except that each firm i’s profits are reduced by 
ci(θi).  In particular, the welfare function of region m is of the form ωm(•|θ I) and profit function 
of firm i is of the form πi(•|θ I)- ci(θi).  As was the case for production plans, we assume that 
welfare and profits are independent of the choice of firms locating outside of the relevant region.  
One might expect that since Theorem 1 implies that subgame perfect equilibria induce 
Pareto efficiency on Γ(θ I) for each conceivable profile of R&D strategies θ I, it must follow that 
efficiency will also prevail in the R&D/firm location game.  Such expectations are unfounded.   
 
Theorem 2: Subgame perfect equilibria of the R&D/firm location game may induce Pareto 
inefficiency. 
 
 
Proof:  We demonstrate the validity of our claim by construction.   So as not to distract with 
superfluous complexity, we construct a simple and intuitive example.  We emphasize that this 
simple counter-example should not be interpreted as representative of all R&D/firm location 
games in which inefficiency prevails as the classes of all such examples are many and varied.   
Assume that there is a single firm, a single feasible production plan, two R&D strategies - 
θ(1)  and θ(2), and two regions competing for the firm’s investment.  The following table 
summarizes the cost of these two R&D strategies as well as the profit and welfare realized when 
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the firm locates in region1 and region2, respectively.  Assume that when the firm does not locate 
in a particular region, that region’s welfare is zero.  
 locate in region1 locate in region2 
 cost  firm profit  region1 welfare  firm profit  region2 welfare 
θ(1): 1 3 3 0 1 
θ(2): 1 1 1 1 2 
The intuition of this example is straightforward.  Both R&D strategies are equally costly, but 
yield distinct results.  The first R&D strategy takes advantage of features specific to region1 
(highly skilled labor, for instance) and is not well suited to locating in region 2 (which may lack 
highly skilled labor, for instance).   The second R&D strategy generates a production technology 
that has less peak production/profit potential, but which is more location neutral.  Region2 is 
more “eager” for firm investment, so it values this modest productivity more highly than 
region1.  (One might feel compelled to include both a “status quo” technology and a 
“comprehensive” technology in which the best of both θ(1)  and θ(2) are realized.  However, if 
the status quo technology is strictly dominated by the alternatives described, there is nothing lost 
in its omission.  Similarly, if the comprehensive technology is prohibitively expensive, it too 
may be neglected without loss of generality.) 
As the reader can readily verify, equilibrium under the θ(1)− subgame  results in the firm 
locating in region 1, paying 2 units profit in taxes, and earning zero net profit (after R&D costs 
and taxes).  Equilibrium under the θ(2)− subgame results in the firm locating in region 2, 
receiving a subsidy of 1, and earning a net profit of 1 (after R&D costs and subsidy).  As the firm 
has the power to select the subgame through its choice of R&D, it will select the θ(2)-subgame, 
an inefficient outcome. QED 
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The intuition underlying this result is straightforward.  Investments in R&D affect firm 
profits as well as region welfare, much like firm production plans.  However, unlike a production 
plan that can be location specific, the state of technical innovation affects welfare potential in all 
regions and the potential profits of all firms.  That is, while firms may choose different 
production plans (different plant designs, different input employment, etc.) at different locations, 
the constraints imposed by what is technologically feasible apply universally.7  Such all-
encompassing “shadow externalities” affect equilibrium behavior but cannot be internalized by 
tax policy, implying that inefficiency may inevitably follow.  
We note that the proof of Theorem 2 does not rely on inefficiencies resulting from 
weakened agglomeration externalities, though it is certainly possible to construct such examples.  
In particular, one could add another firm to the example above and construct a scenario in which 
regional competition leads to firm location in separate regions, despite positive agglomerative 
externalities for joint location by the firms in the same region. 
While the constructive example used in the proof of Theorem 2 is a plausible abstraction, 
we can say something more concrete about the conditions under which we would expect 
inefficiencies to occur.  To do so, we must first construct a formal characterization of the 
aggregate effects induced by a firm choosing to locate within a particular region.  Loosely, the 
potential impact firm i has in region m will be defined to be the incremental effect of firm i 
locating in region m as measured by the sum of region welfare and the firm profits generated 
within the region.  In particular, this measure incorporates all effects of agglomeration 
externalities. 
                                                 
7 Of course, quality and quantity of available inputs may differ across regions, so technology constraints may be 
more confining in some regions than others. 
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Take as given both the R&D decisions of all firms and the location and production 
decisions of all firms except a given firm i.  We define the potential impact firm i has in a given 
region m as the largest impact firm i can have in region m under the given circumstances.  To be 
more precise, let SUM1* denote the sum of region m welfare and the sum of all profits earned 
within region m (including firm i) when firm i locates in m and chooses production plans which 
maximize this sum (the plans of all other firms remaining fixed as well as firm i’s R&D plan).  
Let SUM2 be defined as equal to the sum of region m welfare and the sum of all profits earned 
within region  m (no longer including firm i) when firm i locates elsewhere.  Then the potential 
impact of firm i on region m is equal to SUM1* minus SUM2.   We further define the 1st  best 
potential impact of  firm i as the highest potential impact firm i has amongst all regions.  More 
generally the rth best potential impact of firm i is iteratively defined as the highest potential 
impact firm i has amongst all regions outside of those in which the 1st through (r-1)th best 
potential impacts are realized. 
Finally, we define credible equilibria to be those subgame perfect equilibria in which 
only credible tax incentives are offered by regions, i.e., no region offers a firm incentives that 
exceed the potential impact the firm can have in the region.  Of course incentives that are 
accepted must be credible even in regular subgame perfect equilibria.  Consequently, this added 
credibility restriction is only binding off of the equilibrium path – incentives that are offered but 
not accepted.  The narrowing of our focus to credible equilibria is, in practical terms, 
noncontroversial.  Indeed, it is unlikely that regions would take the effort to design tax incentives 
that they would never want accepted. 
We now have the machinery to articulate the following important result. 
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Theorem 3: If an R&D firm location game is in credible equilibrium then each firm 
maximizes its 2nd best potential impact given the behavior other firms. 
 
Proof: We claim that in credible equilibrium the after tax profit earned by the firm must equal 
the potential impact that firm would have on its second choice region, given its equilibrium R&D 
strategy.  Indeed, if this after tax profit were less than the noted potential impact, then the second 
choice region could unilaterally increase its welfare by altering the tax incentives it offers to 
induce the firm to locate there; contradicting the assumption that firms and regions are in 
equilibrium.  On the other hand, credibility implies that the tax incentives offered by the second 
choice region cannot exceed the potential impact of the firm in question in the second choice 
region.  As the after tax profit in the first choice region cannot exceed that which would be 
earned in the second choice region (else the firm’s first choice could reduce the incentives it 
offers and still induce the firm to locate there) the proof of our claim is complete. 
As each firm seeks to maximize its profit and the above paragraph establishes that its 
profit for each R&D strategy will equal its corresponding 2nd best potential impact, the firm will 
invest in R&D in a manner which maximizes it 2nd best potential impact. QED 
 
Note that Pareto efficiency requires, given the behavior of others, each firm to select the 
R&D strategy that enables it to maximize its 1st best potential impact.  Appealing to Theorem 3, 
we see that Pareto efficiency can be realized in a credible equilibrium only if for each firm, the 
same R&D strategy can be used to maximize its 1st best as well as its 2nd best potential impacts.  
We argue that such circumstances are relatively implausible, especially when a potential for 
agglomeration externalities exists.  We shall say that a firm’s production technology is 
specialized if the production technology best suited for a particular location and a particular set 
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of agglomerating firms is less suited for alternative circumstances.  If the presence of such a 
specialization is required for efficiency to be realized, then inefficiency can be expected to be the 
norm in all credible equilibria.  This conclusion follows immediately by observing that 
specialization implies unequal 1st and 2nd best potential impacts and noting that Theorem 3 thus 
implies inefficiency.  Our general result is highlighted with the following Corollary. 
 
Corollary 4: Credible equilibria induce inefficiency whenever efficiency mandates 
specialized production technology for at least one firm.   
 
Corollary 4 is particularly important for understanding the role of agglomeration 
externalities in the inefficiencies caused by regional competition.  The development and fine 
tuning of the production methods for use in localities with strong agglomeration externalities is 
generally quite different from the efforts that would be pursued if a firm were to instead locate in 
a region where such externalities are modest or nonexistent.  Thus, the very tendency for 
agglomeration externalities to emerge may itself dictate that at least some specialization be 
present in order to realize Pareto efficiency.  In the light of Corollary 4, this fact in turn implies 
that efficiency cannot be credibly attained in equilibrium. 
 
3.2. Case study evidence. 
 There are a number of cases of U.S. states bidding for investment and subsequent firm 
location decisions where the facts of the case are consistent with the model and results we 
present in section 3.1 above.  We obviously do not observe welfare, profit, and efficiencies under 
alternative scenarios and, thus, cannot test the model.  However, what we do observe in the 
following cases is evidence of intense regional competition for large investments and a 
surprisingly strong willingness by firms to substantially alter their production technology in the 
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process to relocate to regions with obviously lower agglomeration externalities in a number of 
dimensions. 
As mentioned in the introduction, one such case is a plant relocation of the Caterpillar 
company, maker of construction and materials handling equipment based in Peoria, Illinois.  
When Caterpillar decided to close its “high-cost” plant in York, Pennsylvania it chose to separate 
and move production into four smaller sites in separate states in southeastern U.S. states 
(Mississippi, North Carolina, Kentucky, and South Carolina), where wages were lower.  As 
reported by Aron (1997), this was a long-term strategy by Caterpillar:  “While Caterpillar is not 
moving jobs out of Peoria, the company’s expansion is in the South.  Due to more limited pools 
of highly skilled labor, Caterpillar is spreading production among a larger number of smaller, 
specialized plants.” (p. 1036).  This suggests an ongoing and concerted effort by Caterpillar to 
devise production methods to make location in areas with lower concentrations of skilled labor 
feasible, thus resulting in reduced agglomeration benefits in this dimension. 
 Another example consistent with our model in section 3.1 involves the well-known 
Mercedes Benz automobile plant location in Alabama in the mid-1990s.  There was intense 
competition for the plant with many states offering very large incentive packages.  When 
Alabama won the bidding war for the Mercedes plant that would begin producing a new model 
of SUV for sale in the United States, the press and state development experts widely decried the 
massive incentives provided by Alabama to Mercedes which totaled over $250 million and 
approximately $160,000 per job created for a $300 million plant. (Indianapolis News, April 1, 
1998).  A large reason cited for the attractiveness of Alabama was the incentives, 30% lower pay 
than in Germany, tradition of hostility toward unions, and access to ports. (Financial Times, 
October 28, 1993).   
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However, experts in the field, as well as Mercedes own managers, stressed that Mercedes 
location in Alabama came with a concomitant change in production process and there are 
indications that many of these different production processes and “go slow” approach to ramping 
up production were due to the workforce they were facing in Alabama.  For example, Sven 
Schoolman, a 31-year-old trainer from a plant in Sindelfingen, Germany said:  “’In Germany, we 
don’t say we build a car.  We say we build a Mercedes. We had to teach that.’”  (Business Week, 
March 31, 1997)  Similarly, a Washington Post article quoted James E. Harbour, an auto industry 
consultant, as saying ’It is going to take a long time to bring that plant up to speed, because it is 
now operating under the most difficult combination of circumstances with everything being all-
new.” (Washington Post, June 29, 1997) 
In addition, there was evidence of much more permanent changes in production 
technology and efficiency as the Alabama factory had much less automation than a typical 
German factory with robots only involved in installing windows.  As summarized by Bill Taylor, 
Vice President of Operations at the plant, “Plant automation was kept simple…We kept the 
process of building an automobile as simple as possible because we already had all these 
variables – new product, new people [most of whom are new to the auto industry], new plant… 
People can only bite off and digest so much at a time.” (Industry Week, October 7, 1996).   
 In summary, these case studies provide evidence that firms made surprisingly substantial 
modification to their production technology so that a move to a new location could be 
economically sound.  For example, Caterpillar split one plant into four separate plants, and 
Mercedes eliminated virtually all their robotic automation.  Both changes required massive 
revision of the production process.  
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These investments also represented locations of firms’ plants away from traditional areas 
with natural agglomerative features, such as a common pool of highly skilled labor and 
established network of local suppliers, to areas without such features. Thus, these relocations 
represent dramatic changes that likely reduce agglomeration externalities for these firms (and in 
the industry in general to some extent).   
It’s possible that wage (and other cost) differentials alone precipitated these relocations.8  
However, it is difficult to believe that the aggressive and substantial state incentives offered to 
these plants did not contribute to the decision by these firms, particularly because of the firm’s 
substantial efforts to alter production processes to fit attributes of the new location. It is also 
important to note that inefficient R&D efforts are likely occurring even if relocation is not taking 
place.  Aron (1997) documents the general tradeoff faced by many industrial machinery firms 
between Midwest regions rich in skilled labor and low-wage less-skilled Southern regions with 
aggressive state incentive programs and suggests that many firms have an ongoing evaluation 
process of alternative locations.   
 
4. Conclusion. 
 While acknowledging that regional competition for investment can be a prisoner’s 
dilemma for the bidding regions, previous literature has found a number of theoretical reasons 
why regional competition may promote efficient location of production.  In contrast, this paper 
identifies new reasons for why regional competition may lead to inefficient outcomes – such 
competition may induce the development of inefficient production technology as well as 
                                                 
8 For example, Hanson (1996) provides a model where agglomeration drives up wages in a center region due to 
congestion, leading firms to relocate production to low-skill, low-wage peripheral regions.  Thus, it provides a story 
of outsourcing certain steps of the production process rather than complete relocation of an integrated production 
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inefficient firm location and inefficient industry agglomeration.  Regional competition gives 
firms incentives to develop (and potentially adopt) technologies that make alternative locations 
more competitive.  This can allow the firm to extract surplus from regions that exceeds the 
productive inefficiency costs of developing (and potentially adopting) new technologies.  In 
addition, it may lead to inefficient location of investment with a concomitant lessening of 
agglomeration externalities.  The case studies we present illustrate the surprising alterations in 
production technology that established firms can and will make in response to regional 
competition for their investment.   
                                                                                                                                                             
process.  Hanson’s model does not include regional competition for investments and assumes firms’ technologies 
are fixed.    
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